Chapter 5 · Lesson 2 of 6 · about 12 minutes
Function first, then three radiation questions
One regulator can feed the processor, the memory and the recovery controller. One ADC can serve a single housekeeping measurement or close a critical control loop. Trace each part to its function and its recovery path before deciding which radiation concern to work first.
One small part can stop several functions.
A regulator may feed the processor, the memory and the controller that is supposed to recover them. An ADC may affect one housekeeping measurement, or it may close a control loop the mission depends on. Before you decide which radiation concern to work first, trace the part to the function it supports and to the path by which that function would be recovered.
The same part with the same exposure can have very different consequences depending on where it sits in the circuit.
Ask the designer about the actual circuit.
Sit down with the designer and record the rails, bias, load, duty cycle, temperature, operating modes, interfaces, timing and the parameter limits the circuit can tolerate. Map what is shared: power, clocks, reset and fault detection. Then check whether the protection and recovery circuits stay powered, and stay visible in telemetry, during the failure they are meant to handle.
A spare channel does not help if both channels share the rail or the reset that failed.
Ask three separate radiation questions.
Total ionizing dose can shift parameters as exposure accumulates. Displacement damage can reduce carrier lifetime and optical response. A single event can interrupt a function, corrupt data or destroy the part. The technology and the function tell you which of these endpoints to investigate for a given part, and a passed dose test says nothing about the single-event question.
Use the technology to focus the first pass.
The technology points to where to look first: TID and SETs in analog parts, SEU and SEFI and possible destructive modes in complex logic, bias-dependent destructive SEE in power devices, and DD in minority-carrier and optical chains. These are starting points for the investigation and do not by themselves assign a susceptibility; a part can still surprise you outside its category. Conventional passives are usually a lower priority for these mechanisms, but their construction, their use in the circuit and their other hazards still get reviewed.
When you decide an effect is out of scope for a part, write down why. A part with no data is a different finding from a part whose mechanism has been ruled out.
The first pass, by technology
Before you search for any data, sort the parts list by technology. Any part with CMOS in the die can latch up. Any part with memory elements can upset. Any part with control logic or registers can stop in a state it does not leave on its own. Analog paths, clocks and regulators produce transients, and what those transients do is decided by the circuit that receives them. Power devices under bias can burn out or rupture. Minority-carrier and optical devices lose performance to displacement damage. Every active part accumulates dose. None of these is a finding about the part; each is a question the part raises. The chart below walks one BOM line through the questions, the tabbed set after it does the same for the common device families, and lesson 5.4 shows how a question is then closed with evidence. Four outcomes are possible for each question: closed by evidence that applies, an action (a targeted test, an analysis, supplier data, a design change or a replacement), bounded by the design, or accepted by the project as a documented residual with its scope stated.
Exercise on the demonstration board
On the demonstration board, select U1 and U5 and compare what each one feeds and what its proposed recovery depends on. Then switch the evidence view between total dose, displacement damage and single events for one part and notice how the question changes with each view. Finally select U4, the optocoupler, and treat the LED, the receiver and the circuit threshold as one signal chain rather than one part.
Going deeper
Keep failure paths and dependencies visible.
Translate each part-level failure mode into the circuit and system state it produces: an output that drifts, a transient that the next stage captures, a bus held in contention, corrupted memory, a functional interrupt or a destructive current. For each one, follow where it propagates, whether anything detects it, whether it can sit dormant, what else shares the cause and when in the mission it would matter most. A block diagram shows the intended independence and recovery paths. It generally does not show the shared rail or the shared reset that defeats them, so do not infer either from the diagram alone.
SEECA and the circuit and fault analyses support this mapping. A component upset rate becomes a mission-loss rate only after it has been carried through the function and the recovery path.
Let the structure determine the mechanism boundary.
A technology name is a starting hypothesis about the device, and the device structure decides which mechanisms apply. Charge collection, parasitic paths, the oxide and interface response, minority-carrier lifetime and high-field regions each govern different effects, and a hybrid can contain several technologies in one package. Before you exclude a mechanism for the whole part, check the dose history, the material, the bias, the temperature and the endpoint that the exclusion depends on.
The mechanisms chapter gives the device models. This chapter is where you record whether that model applies to the part on this BOM line.
The common mistake
Calling a part payload or redundant does not make its failure tolerable. Trace the failure path before you accept the label, and do not exclude an effect on the strength of a part-number prefix.
Takeaway
- Criticality comes from the function and the failure path, so trace both before ranking a part.
- TID, DD and SEE are three separate questions with three separate evidence trails.
Check yourself
A regulator feeds the processor, the memory and the recovery controller, but the board has a redundant channel, so the designer rates the regulator as low criticality. What should the review check before accepting that?
Criticality comes from the function and the failure path, and a spare channel does not help if both channels share the rail or the reset that failed. Map what is shared (power, clocks, reset and fault detection) and check whether the protection and recovery circuits stay powered, and stay visible in telemetry, during the failure they are meant to handle. A block diagram shows the intended independence and generally does not show the shared rail or reset that defeats it, so neither should be inferred from the diagram alone; calling a part payload or redundant does not make its failure tolerable.
A passed TID test is on file for an ADC that closes a control loop, and the designer argues that the radiation question for that part is closed. What is missing?
TID, DD and SEE are three separate questions with three separate evidence trails, and a passed dose test says nothing about the single-event question. A mixed-signal converter produces transients that are judged at the receiving function, can deliver incorrect codes, and holds its configuration in registers, which raises the SEFI question of the digital flow; if the die is CMOS, the latchup question is open as well. U5 on the demonstration board shows the gap: DC parameter data exist, but the converter test covers one sample rate, the reference and SEFI coverage is incomplete, and the measured code errors still have to be mapped to the control loop rather than reported as a part-level count.
Walk U3, the bipolar amplifier, through the first-pass screen. Which questions does the chart not raise for it, and why is the dose question the one that stays open longest?
A bipolar linear process without CMOS, so the latchup question is not raised (a BiCMOS variant would raise it), and no memory elements and no control logic, so there is no SEU or SEFI question. The analog path raises transients, judged at the comparator it feeds (transients of up to 1 V and 2 µs against a 0.25 V receiving threshold, mitigated by a 20 µs low-pass filter, lesson 10.3), and the bipolar gain raises displacement damage, generally closed by analysis at this fluence. The dose question is TID with ELDRS, whose low-dose-rate leg takes weeks (lesson 6.2) and whose answer is lot-specific, so it is the one that stays open into chapter 11.
The first-pass screen opens a question for almost every part: any CMOS die can latch up, any memory element can upset, any controller can stop in a state it does not leave. Why does the course insist that a yes is not a finding about the part?
A yes means evidence is needed; it does not mean the part is susceptible. Each question the technology raises ends in one of four dispositions: closed by evidence that applies, an action (a targeted test, an analysis, supplier data, a design change or a replacement), bounded by the design, or accepted by the project as a documented residual with its scope stated. The converse also holds: when an effect is ruled out of scope, write down why, because a part with no data is a different finding from a part whose mechanism has been ruled out. Every family has exceptions (a CMOS part on a latchup-free process, a bipolar part without ELDRS, an optocoupler with a CMOS receiver), and the evidence, not the chart, answers the question.
U4, the optocoupler, is one line on the BOM. Why does the course ask you to treat the LED, the receiver and the circuit threshold as one signal chain, and which question dominates?
An optocoupler is an LED, a photodetector and a receiver amplifier in one package, so the construction is part of the identity: the receiver is an analog path on which a transient is a false edge on the link, and the LED and the detector raise displacement damage, which is the dominant question for this part. The endpoint is the current transfer ratio at the flight drive current against the mission proton fluence, converted through the damage curve of the LED material (GaAs here) rather than silicon NIEL, and judged against what the receiver needs: on the teaching curve the CTR falls to 83 % of its initial value at five years and the receiver needs 0.5 of the initial 1.2 (lesson 10.4). A CMOS receiver would add the latchup question.
Further reading
- NASA Avionics Radiation Hardness Assurance Guidelines (2021), §3
- G. R. Allen, "Predicting On-Orbit Performance of Devices," RADECS 2025 Short Course, Slides 4–5 and notes: mission consequence and multidisciplinary RHA
- LaBel, Johnston, Barth, Reed and Barnes (1998), Emerging RHA Issues, §III
- IEEE NSREC 2017 Short Course, "RHA for Satellite Systems, From Macro to Nano", §3
- Space-RHA parts advisor